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I. KEEPING Up WrTH TECHNOLOGY
The United States, Japan, and the Common Market countries, among
other advanced and industrialized societies of the modem world, have
been confronted with an unparalleled profusion of new products resulting
from seventy-five years of advances in technology and scientific know-how
*W. Page Keeton Professor in the Law of Torts, University of Texas School
of Law. A.B., LL.B., 1931, University of Texas; S.J.D., 1936, Harvard University;
LL.D. (Hon.), 1974, Southern Methodist University; Dean, University of Texas
School of Law, 1949-1974; President, Association of American Law Schools, 1961;
American Bar Association's Award of Excellence to an Educator, 1975.
IThe following is adapted from a speech given by Professor Keeton at the
University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law on March 19, 1980, as the Adler
Foundation Lawyer-in-Residence Lecture. With the speaker's assistance, the edit-
ors have restructured the speech given in Professor Keeton's colloquial style into
article form. Footnotes have also been added by the editors and Professor Keeton.
The editors realize that there is a risk of losing emphasis and context by reorga-
nizing a presentation which can best be described as "vintage Keeton" into an
article for publication. With the assistance of Professor Keeton, however, the
editors feel that such loss has been kept to a minimum.
Although some of the material contained within the text of Professor Keeton's
speech has been previously published, see note 1 infra, the editors believe that
the following is a useful review of basic principles in products liability law. Ad-
ditionally, Professor Keeton takes a new and fresh approach to some of the issues
discussed. One point in particular is his discussion of the "state of the art."
Readers who desire to pursue Professor Keeton's analysis and theories in
greater detail are referred to the following materials: P. KEErON &c R. KEETON,
CASEs AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW or To TS (1971); Keeton, Manufacturer's Lia-
bility: The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture and Design of Products, 20
SymacusE L. REv. 559 (1969); Keeton, Product Liability and the Automobile, 9
FoRum 1 (1973); Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST.
579
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that have exceeded those which occurred in all the preceding history of
the human race.l We probably have not seen anything yet to compare
with what we will see in the way of future technological advances in the
world. As a motto on the Museum of Natural History in Washington, D.C.,
reads, "All the past is but a prologue." If nothing else, this unrestrained
technological change has been a boom to lawyers as well as an awesome
challenge to the legal profession.
One result of this proliferation of new products has been the great
growth of new categories and dimensions of injuries, attributable to a
variety of damaging events, that we did not know existed when the law
began its development in the nineteenth century. Previously unknown
dangers such as traffic accidents, airplane accidents, workplace accidents
with machinery, home accidents with appliances, and medical mishaps
with drugs are now commonplace. For example, 20,000,000 Americans are
injured each year in their homes with consumer products. Of those injured,
30,000 are killed and 110,000 are permanently disabled.2 Another 7,000,000
are injured in work-related accidents.3
This proliferation of products has created two serious problems for
the social order. The first is that of accident prevention.4 The second is
that of allocating the costs of accidents after they occur.5
MARY's L.J. 80 (1978); Keeton, Products Liability-Design Hazards and the Mean-
ing of Defect, 10 CGr. L. Rxv. 298 (1979); Keeton, Products Liability-Drugs and
Cosmetics, 25 VAND. L. REv. 131 (1972); Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy of
Information, 48 TEx. L. R.v. 898 (1970); Keeton, Products Liability-Liability
Without Fault and the Requirement of a Defect, 41 Trx. L. Rrv. 855 (1968);
Keeton, Products Liability-Problems Pertaining to Proof of Negligence, 19 Sw.
L.J. 26 (1965); Keeton, Products Liability-Proof of the Manufacturer's Negli-
gence, 49 VA. L. Rv. 675 (1968); Keeton, Products Liability-Some Observations
About Allocation of Risks, 64 Micr. L. R.mv. 1829 (1966); Keeton, Products Liabil-
ity-The Nature and Extent of Strict Liability, 1964 U. ILL. L.F. 698; Keeton,
Some Observations About the Strict Liability of the Maker of Prescription Drugs:
The Aftermath of MER/29, 56 CALFr. L. REv. 149 (1968).
1. Professor Keeton's March speech at the University of Missouri-Columbia
parallels his most recent law review article, Products Liability-Design Hazards
and the Meaning of Defect, 10 Gum. L. Rav. 298 (1979). While the Missouri Law
Review editors have provided footnotes to Professor Keeton's speech in order- to
furnish the reader with a solid foundation for further investigation of the points
discussed, the reader is referred to the Cumberland Law Review article for a well
developed explanation of many of the same issues.
2. A. -WEINSTmN, A. TwEasni, H. PzExLER & W. DONAHER, PRODucrs LIA-
IIUTY AND THE REASONABLY SAFE PRODUcr: A GuIDE FOR MANAGEMENT, DESIGN,
AND MARKENG § 3 (1978).
3. Id.
4. The reduction of the incidence of harm resulting from unsafe products
is often given as a justification for the imposition of liability without fault on
the manufacturer and retailer. See Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d
453, 460, 150 P.2d 436, 489-40 (1944); Jacob E. Decker &c Sons v. Capps, 189 Tex.
609, 612-18, 164 S.W.2d 828, 829-30 (1942); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel
(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1119 (1960). For a discussion
of the fallacies of this reasoning, see Keeton, Products Liability-Some Observa-
tions About Allocation of Risks, 64 MicHr. L. REv. 1829, 1338 (1966).
5. Costs of product accidents are generally placed upon the manufacturer.
The principal reason given for shifting losses from consumers to manufacturers is
(Vol. 45
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Accident prevention has been directly attacked in this country, es-
pecially in the last fifteen or twenty years, through government regulation
of standards for products that we buy,6 and government regulation of the
conditions under which products are made and sold. 7 While we have ex-
perienced this host of government regulations to prevent accidents, there
has also been a great revolution in the law dealing with the allocation of
the cost of accidents.
Until about thirty years ago, recovery on behalf of those victimized in
society was obtainable primarily against those who misused products.8 A
theory of negligence or fault generally provided the exclusive basis for
this recovery.9 Occasionally, but only occasionally, claims were successfully
maintained against product manufacturers and retailers.10 This most likely
occurred when a damaging event was proven to be attributable to negli-
gence in the sale of a product with a flaw therein,"1 or when there had been
some kind of miscarriage in the construction process, as in the celebrated
that those engaged in the manufacturing process have the capacity to distribute
the losses of a few among many purchasers. The assumption is that the manufact-
urer can shift losses to consumers by charging higher prices for its products. See
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63-64, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1962); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 51 Ill. App. 2d 318, 325,
201. N.E.2d 313, 317 (1964); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358,
370-74, 161 A.2d 69, 76-78 (1960); Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12
N.Y.2d 432, 437, 191 N.E.2d 81, 83, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 595 (1963); Price v. Gatlin,
241 Or. 315, 317, 405 P.2d 502, 503 (1965). See generally Calabresi, Transaction
Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules-A Comment, 11 J.L. & EcoN. 67
(1968); Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960); Keeton, supra
note 4; Ruud, Manufacturer's Liability for Representations Made by Their Sales
Engineers to Subpurchasers, 8 U.C.L.A. L. R.y. 251 (1961).
6. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1193 (1976) (flammability standards); 15 U.S.C.§§ 1391-1420 (1976) (motor vehicle safety standards); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1426
(1976) (tire safety standards); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1471-1476 (1976) (packaging of
household substances for protection of children).
7, See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1232 (1976) (new car sticker information); 15
U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1976) (cigarette labeling and advertising); 15 U.S.C. §
1421 (1976) (labeling for pneumatic tires); 15 U.S.C. § 1451-1461 (1976) (fair
packaging and labeling); 21 U.S.C. § 16 (1976) (false labeling on food or dairy
products); 21 U.S.C. § 343 (1976) (misbranded food).
8. See generally Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of "De-fect" in the Manufacture and Design of Products, 20 SYRAcusE L. Ray. 559
(1969); Keeton, Products Liability-Liability Without Fault and the Require-
ment of a Defect, 41 Tax. L. REy. 855 (1963); Keeton, Products Liability-
Proof of the Manufacturer's Negligence, 49 VA. L. Rrv. 675 (1963).
9. See Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292, 295-96 (1850); Keeton,
supra note 4, at 1330.
10. See, e.g., Boeing Airplane Co. v. Brown, 291 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1961)
(defect in airplane component); Evangelio v. Metropolitan Bottling Co., 339
Mass. 177, 158 N.E.2d 342 (1959) (bottle of carbonated beverage exploded);
Comstock v. General Motors Corp., 358 Mich. 163, 99 N.W.2d 627 (1959) (de-
fective brakes); Standard Motor Co. v. Blood, 380 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. Civ. App.
1964) (defective braking system).
11. See generally Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d
168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964); Comstock v. General Motors Corp., 358 Mich.
163, 99 N.W.2d 627 (1959).
1980]
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MacPherson case.' 2 In that case, there was a flaw in the product, rather
than a design hazard.'8 In MacPherson, the flaw was in the wheel of an
automobile.14 But MacPherson was a unique development for its time and
such claims against a manufacturer, even as regarding flaws, were rare.
During the last twenty years, however, due in part to a more sophisti-
cated approach by the trial bar to allocate the cost of damaging events,' 5
and in part to changes in the substantive law relating to the liability of
those who are in the business of supplying products for the use of others,'
6
claims made and claims paid against suppliers have increased dramatical-
ly.17 A large part of these claims have been based on events resulting from
the way products are designed, and not simply as a result of flaws attribut-
able to miscarriages in the manufacturing process.' 8 This revolution in the
law has been spearheaded by the judiciary, not the legislatures. 19 In fact,
12. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
Other cases predicating liability upon defective products resulting from a mis-
carriage in the manufacturing process are: Putnam v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338
F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964) (defective fork stem of wheelchair); Gottsdanker v.
Cutter Labs., 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1960) (live virus in polio
vaccine); Noonan v. Buick Co., 211 So. 2d 54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (seat
not secured to floor of car); Townsend v. Cleve Heyl Chevrolet-Buick, Inc.,
318 So. 2d 618 (La. Ct. App. 1975) (bolt worked loose or failed); Campbell
Soup Co. v. Dusek, 242 Miss. 450, 135 So. 2d 414 (1961) (piece of metal in
soup); Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81,
240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963) (defective altimeter in airplane); Griggs Canning Co.
v. Josey, 139 Tex. 623, 164 S.W.2d 835 (1942) (contaminated spinach); Sham-
rock Fuel Oil & Sales Co. v. Tunks, 406 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966)
(adulterated kerosene exploded at low flash point).
13. 217 N.Y. at 390-91, 111 N.E. at 1053.
14. Id. at 385, 111 N.E. at 1051.
15. See Keeton, supra note 1, at 294 n.5.
16. See Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. M~ARx's
L.J. 30, 33 (1973) ("The change in the substantive law . . . has been from fault
to defect."). See generally Keeton, Products Liability-Liability Without Fault and
the Requirement of a Defect, 41 TEx. L. Rxv. 855 (1963); Owen, Rethinking the
Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L. REv. 681 (1980).
17. See Keeton, supra note 1, at 294 n.7.
18. See, e.g., Passwaters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270 (8th Cir.
1972) (unshielded metal flanges on wheel cover); Larsen v. General Motors Corp.,
391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968) (defective steering assembly in automobile); Cronin
v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972)
(fragile metal hasp holding cargo in delivery truck); Self v. General Motors Corp.,
42 Cal. App. 3d 1, 116 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1974) (fuel tank on station wagon de-
fectively designed); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Nutt, 407 A.2d 606 (D.C. 1979)
(lack of toe guard on elevator); Hancock v. Paccar, Inc., 204 Neb. 468, 283 N.W.2d
25 (1979) (automobile bumper of insufficient strength); Suter v. San Angelo
Foundry g& Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979) (failure to install rotary
guard on sheet-metal rolling machine); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or.411, 579 P.2d 1287 (1978) (failure to use fuel-injected engine); Young v. Tide
Craft, Inc., 270 S.C. 458, 242 S.E.2d 671 (1978) (absence of kill switch in motor-
boat); Lamon v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 19 Wash. App. 515, 576 P.2d 426(1978) (lack of spring device on airplane escape hatch).
19. See Keeton, supra note 4, at 1330. See generally Henderson, Renewed
Judicial Controversy Over Defective Product Design: Toward the Preservation of
an Emerging Consensus, 63 MINN. L. Rzv. 773 (1979); Keeton, Creative Continuity
[Vol. 45
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legislators have responded with a counterrevolution, a development to
which I, as a supporter of most of the revolutionary changes herein dis-
cussed, do not subscribe. This counterrevolution, taking place in Congress
and in the state legislatures, focuses on efforts to undo what the courts
have done; 20 the belief being that liability has expanded beyond what
society can afford.2 1
It is not yet possible to fully assess the impact of this counterrevolution.
It is more important for now to discuss the revolution which has occurred
in this area of the law and to formulate direction for new developments
consistent with these innovative changes.
II. BASES FOR PRODUCTS LiABmxrr
Presently there are two systems for liability under our legal structures:
one applicable to those who supply products for the use of others, and
one applicable to those who use products. Prior to 1960, recovery was
sometimes available against the merchant-seller or manufacturer of a "de-
fectively dangerous product" pursuant to a so-called contract-warranty
theory or a tort-negligence theory.22
A person who was physically harmed seldom recovered, however, on
contract-warranty theory because of two obstacles. The first obstacle re-
sulted from the fact that under contract law it was recognized that a party
to the contract could disclaim all warranty obligations, 23 could limit the
duration of those warranty obligations,2 4 and could limit the remedy for
those warranty obligations, such as agreeing only to replace defective
in the Law of Torts, 75 HARv. L. REv. 463 (1962); Owen, supra note 16. For a
discussion of the development of tort law leading up to strict liability, see Daly
v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 731-33, 575 P.2d 1162, 1165-66, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 380, 383-84 (1978).
20. See generally Keeton, supra note 1; Prosser, supra note 4.
21. While not participating in this counterrevolution, Professor Keeton has
recognized that "[sihifting losses . . . in every situation would be an arbitrary
process, and it would involve a net loss to society because of the economic and
sociological costs of adjudications." Keeton, Products Liability-The Nature and
Extent of Strict Liability, 1964 U. ILL. L.F. 693, 693 (footnote omitted). See also
Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy of Information, 48 Tmx. L. Rzrv. 398,
401-02 (1970); R. Keeton & O'Connell, Basic Protection-A Proposal for Improv-
ing Automobile Claims Systems, 78 H~Auv. L. Rxv. 329, 330-31 (1964).
22. See, e.g., Crystal Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cathey, 83 Ariz. 163, 317
P.2d 1094 (1957) (warranty theory); Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d
453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) (tort-negligence theory); Worley v. Proctor & Gamble
Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 258 S.W.2d 532 (St. L. 1952) (upholding validity
of warranty theory but reversing consumer's verdict on causation grounds); Ma-
douros v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 230 Mo. App. 275, 90 S.W.2d 445(K.C. 1936) (warranty theory); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc, 32 N.J.'
358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (warranty theory); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217
N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) (tort-negligence theory).
23. See Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of "Defect" in the
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parts. 25 Under warranty law, the parties were free to contract out all lia-
bility for harm resulting from defective products because of notions about
"freedom of contract."26
The second obstacle to recovery, which could be even more profound
for those victimized by dangerous products, was that under contract law
only those who were privy to a contract of purchase or sale could recover
for breach of warranty. 27 Thus, a manufacturer was virtually immune from
all responsibility because he seldom sold his product directly to the people
who were victimized by the product.28 These two obstacles to recovery
virtually made contract law a worthless remedy in products cases. 29
There were also two serious obstacles to recovery on a tort-negligence
theory. One was the difficulty of proving negligence in a products liability
case. In some situations, such as with traffic accidents, it is not too difficult
to prove existing negligence. But even when negligence is present in de-
fective products cases, the job of proving it can be quite difficult.80
Another serious obstacle to recovery on a tort-negligence theory was
that, at least prior to 1960, the defendant could satisfy any duty of care
that he owed as regards design hazards by warning about nonobvious
dangers3 1 No recovery was allowed for harm resulting from an obvious
25. See id. The Uniform Commercial Code contained a specific provision
allowing a seller to disclaim both express and implied warranties. U.C.C. § 2-816
(1966 version).
26. See generally Keeton, Products Liability-Proof of the Manufacturer's
Negligence, 49 VA. L. REv. 675 (1968).
27. See Keeton, supra note 23, at 560. The first reported case to extend lia-
bility of the seller beyond those in privity was Mazetti v. Armour &c Co., 75 Wash.
622, 135 P. 633 (1913). Almost fifty years later the landmark case of Henningsen
v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), eliminated privity
of contract, in a marketing sense, as a limitation for recovery on a warranty
theory. Accord, Drayton v. Jiffee Chem. Corp., 591 F.2d 852 (6th Cir. 1978) (breach
of warranty coupled with physical injury); Inglio v. American Motors Corp., 3
Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965) (express warranty); Rogers v. Toni Home
Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958) (false safety warnings).Cf. Allied Aviation Fueling Co. v. Dover Corp., 287 N.W.2d 657 (Minn. 1980)(buyer with knowledge of alleged defect and means to correct it could not re-
cover economic loss on a strict liability theory); Vetovitz Bros. v. Kenny Constr.
Co., 60 Ohio App. 2d 331, 397 N.E.2d 412 (1978) (where no privity, no recovery
for economic loss under either express or implied warranty).
28. See Keeton, supra note 23, at 560.
29. See id.
30. See id. See generally Ashe, So You're Going to Try a Products Liability
Case, 13 HAsrmGs L.J. 66 (1961); articles cited note 8 supra.
31. Messina v. Clark Equip. Co., 263 F.2d 291, 292-93 (2d Cir. 1959); Campo
v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 472, 95 N.E.2d 802, 804 (1950) (Campo was overruled
in Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976)).
But see Wright v. Massey-Harris, Inc., 68 Ill. App. 2d 70, 215 N.E.2d 465 (1966)(no safety shield in obvious place on cornpicker-recovery permitted); Stenberg v.
Beatrice Foods Co., 576 P.2d 725 (Mont. 1978) (no safety shield on grain auger-judgment for manufacturer reversed); Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 3 Wash.
App. 508, 476 P.2d 713 (1970) (no safety guard on hay bailer drawbar-recovery
permitted).
For a discussion of the manufacturer's duty to warn, see generally Dillar 8&
Hart, Products Liability: Directions for Use and the Duty to Warn, 41 VA. L. Rv.
[Vol. 45
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hazard.82 If the danger or defect was latent, the duty of care could be sat-
isfied by warning about it3 3 There are many cases prior to 1960 where
the jury was entrusted with evaluating design hazards, but nearly all of
them are failure to warn cases. 34 The basic theory was that if the purchaser
knew what he was buying in terms of the risk or hazard, then the manu-
facturer had fulfilled his duty under the law.3 5
Today, however, in nearly all states, the supplier (merchant-seller or
manufacturer) of a product that was defective and unreasonably dangerous
at the time possession was surrendered is subject to liability without proof
of negligence to all those to whom harm is likely to result from the kind of
defect that is established.36 As I have expressed the matter for some years,
the product must be defective as marketed.3 7 It can be defective as market-
ed for one of three reasons.
First, the product can be defective as marketed because of a flaw.
Courts will often use the term "construction defect" to refer to what is
best characterized as a flaw. Flaws can develop in the marketing process,
as distinguished from the construction process. For example, when bottles
are cracked as a result of mishandling and an explosion results, the flaw
145 (1955); Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a
Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816 (1962).
32. A similar limitation on recovery is presently used in many jurisdictions.
See RESTATE NMT (SECOND) Op TORTS § 388, Comment k (1965). See also Messina
v. Clark Equip. Co., 263 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1959) (liability limited to hidden de-
fects and concealed dangers); Schemel v. General Motors Corp., 384 F.2d 802 (7th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 945 (1968) (no duty to warn about automobile's
capability for excessive speeds) (Schemel, insofar as it relied on Evans v. General
Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966), was
overruled in Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1977)); Sowles
v. Urschel Labs., Inc., 595 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir. 1979) (no duty to warn of obvious
danger); Murphy v. Cory Pump & Supply Co., 47 Ill. App. 2d 382, 197 N.E.2d
849 (1964) (obvious that no guard was in front of lawnmower blades).
33. See cases cited note 31 supra.
34. See, e.g., National Pressure Cooker Co. v. Stroeter; 50 F.2d 642, 644 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 674 (1931). See generally cases cited in Annot., 76
A.L.R.2d 9 (1961). For post-1960 decisions which also made use of the failure to
warn theory, see Land O' Lakes Creameries, Inc. v. Hungerholt, 319 F.2d 352 (8th
Cir. 1963); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr.
398 (1967); La Plant v. E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 346 S.W.2d 231 (Mo.
App., Spr. 1961).
35. See generally Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy of Information, 48
Txx. L. R.mv. 398 (1970).
36. A landmark case in the development of strict liability recovery is Green-
man v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1962). See generally RESrATEENT (SEcoND) oF TORTS § 402A (1965); Prosser,
supra note 4.
Missouri abandoned the restrictive rule of privity of contract under an im-
plied warranty theory in Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., 372 S.W.2d 41 (Mo.
En Banc 1963).
37. See Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY's
L.J. 30, 33 (1973) ("The plaintiff is no longer required to impugn the maker, but
he is required to impugn the product. Simply stated, the product must be defec-
tive as marketed... ."); Keeton, Products Liability-Liability Without Fault and
the Requirement of a Defect, 41 Txx. L. R1v. 855, 858 (1963).
1980]
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is in the marketing process, not the construction process. A flaw in a pro-
duct is defined as an abnormality or a condition that was unintended, and
makes the product more dangerous than it would have been as intended.38
This is a very important definition even though it often requires drawing
a difficult line or.making a hard distinction.
An example of a flaw under this definition would be the rotten wood
in the wheel in MacPherson.89 Other examples are a bubble in a tire that
causes it to blow out,40 an "uningredient" in a drug that causes it to be
toxic and poisonous, 4' broken glass in a bottle of Coca-Cola,42 or a de-
composed mouse in the bottom of a bottle of Coca-Cola.43 A flaw is un-
reasonably dangerous per se, i.e., to recover, a plaintiff need not prove
anything more than a flaw in the product which caused the accident. 44
Second, a product may be defective as marketed because of a failure
to adequately warn, or a failure to use proper means to warn about a risk
or hazard related to the way the product was designed.4 5 Although this
begins to involve design hazards, liability is imposed on the ground that
the seller or manufacturer failed adequately to warn about some risk or
hazard, or failed adequately to instruct about how to avoid the risk or
harm. Under this approach, the product is allegedly defective as marketed
because of the failure to properly present it to purchasers and users.
Notwithstanding what some courts have said,46 in establishing this
ground of recovery, the plaintiff in most states must prove negligence in
the failure to warn properly.4 7 There will be no liability in these cases
38. See Keeton, supra note 1, at 297.
39. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
40. McLean v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 85 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 299 U.S. 600 (1936).
41. Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1096 (1974).
42. Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927).
43. Paul v. Rodgers Bottling Co., 183 Cal. App. 2d 680, 6 Cal. Rptr. 867(L96.. See generally Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5
ST. MARY's L.J. 30 (1973); Owen, supra note 16; Wade, Strict Tort Liability of
Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965).
45. See Palmer v. Avco Distrib. Corp., 75 IlM. App. 3d 598, 603-04, 394 N.E.
2d 480, 484-85 (1979); Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 83 Mich. App. 74, 81, 268
N.W.2d 291, 294 (1978); Dover Corp. v. Perez, 587 S.W.2d 761, 765 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1979); Haugen v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 15 Wash. App. 379, 387,
550 P.2d 71, 76-77 (1976).
46. See, e.g., Teagle v. Fischer & Porter Co., 89 Wash. 2d 149, 155, 570 P.2d
438, 442 (1977) (failure to warn can be a "defect").
47. See generally Parke-Davis & Co. v. Stromsodt, 411 F.2d 1390 (8th Cir.
1969); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1969); Tinnerholm
v. Parke, Davis & Co., 285 F. Supp. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), modified, 411 F.2d 48(2d Cir. 1969); Rumsey v. Freeway Manor Minimax, 423 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1968); Dillar & Hart, supra note 31; Keeton, supra note 35; Noel, supra
note 31; Noel, Products Defective Because of Inadequate Directions or Warnings,
23 Sw. L.J. 256 (1969); Noel, Recent Trends In Manufacturer's Negligence as to
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without a showing that the defendant knew or should have known of the
risk or hazard about which he failed to warn. Moreover, there will be no
liability unless the seller or manufacturer failed to take the precautions
that a reasonable person would take in presenting the product to the pub-
lic.48
Although this ground of recovery is sometimes referred to as strict
liability,49 it is really nothing more than a ground of negligence liability
better described as the sale of a product in a defective condition. For
example, in Moran v. Williams,50 a bottle of cologne contained an in-
gredient which was pleasantly scented, but highly inflammable. A group
of teenage children were having a good time after a party and decided
that a few burning candles would be improved if they gave off nice odors.
The teenagers poured the cologne on the lighted candles. One of the teen-
agers was seriously burned and disfigured as a consequence. The product,
as designed, was not defective per se, but there was no warning about the
inflammability of the cologne. A good warning would have prevented
liability.51
This is a difficult problem for manufacturers because there is hardly
any warning that could not be improved. The plaintiff nearly always can
allege with some certainty that the warning could have been made better.
On the other hand, if you had warnings to take care of all the risks in
products, you would have two or three pages that no one would read, i.e.,
the warning that goes into too much detail would be counterproductive.
Probably the best warning for the cologne in Moran v. Williams would
have been printed in large letters as follows: HIGHLY INFLAMMABLE.
DON'T GET NEAR FLAMES.52
Finally, a product may be defective as marketed because of a de-
fective design. There has been great confusion, controversy, and uncer-
tainty among judges and commentators with respect to the scope of lia-
bility for harm flowing from hazards attributable to the way products are
designed. 53 Appellate judges have often been imprecise and vague in their
opinions about the standards for evaluation of product designs and about
the respective functions of judge and jury in determining whether the
48. See, e.g., Torrogrossa v. Towmotor Co., 44 N.Y.2d 709, 376 N.E.2d 920,
405 N.Y.S.2d 448 (1978) (no liability for absence of warning about careful driving).
49. See Keeton, supra note 23, at 563; Keeton, supra note 35, at 399-412.
50. 19 Md. App. 546, 313 A.2d 527 (1974).
51. See, e.g., Teagle v. Fischer &c Porter Co., 89 Wash. 2d 149, 155, 570 P.2d
438, 442 (1977) (product may be flawless but still not reasonably safe without
adequate warning).
52. See generally Dillar & Hart, supra note 31; Keeton, supra note 35; Noel,
supra note 31; Noel, Products Defective Because of Inadequate Directions or Warn-
ings, 23 Sw. L.J. 256 (1969); Noel, Recent Trends In Manufacturer's Negligence
as to Design, Instructions or Warnings, 19 Sw. L.J. 43 (1965).
53. See generally Carsey, What Constitutes a Design Defect in Products Lia-
bility Cases, 21 Fr'N INs. CouNsEL Q. 107 (1970); Henderson, Design Defect Liti-
gation Revisited, 61 Comnr.r L. Rlv. 541 (1976); Keeton, supra note 23; Keeton,
supra note 44; Keeton, supra note 35.
1980]
9
Keeton: Keeton: Meaning of Defect in Products Liability Law
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1980
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [ 4
design hazard in a product is more dangerous than it should be.54 A large
part of the difficulty regarding design hazards is a consequence of the fact
that liability was originally based on a breach of warranty theory.55 The
whole notion underlying warranty was that the seller was representing
something that was not true about his product, that he was misrepresenting
the safety characteristics of his product. 56 These early cases held that the
warranty disclaimer was unconscionable and unenforceable, and that the
usual privity of contract rules would not apply.57 A source of considerable
confusion was that the language used to articulate the kind of hazardous
condition that would constitute a defect for a prima fade torts daim was
often the same language that was used to describe a breach of warranty
claim.58
It is imperative that a test for defectiveness of design be well reasoned
and clearly articulated if this confusion is to be resolved. To that task, I
now turn.
III. A TT FoR PRODUCr DEFEcrIVENEss
There are essentially two different approaches to the question of how
to evaluate design hazards in determining whether or not they are more
dangerous than they should be.59 One is the so-called purchaser or con-
sumer contemplation test, and the second is what I refer to as the danger
versus utility balancing test or risk-utility test.
A. The Consumer Contemplation Test
Under the consumer contemplation test, and as so stated in section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a product is defectively dang-
erous if it is dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be con-
54. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 483 (1972), discussed in Keeton, supra note 44, at 80-32. See also Traynor,
The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TNN. L.
REv. 353, 373 (1965).
55. Tort and warranty theories still often arise under the same fact situa-
tions. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962); Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340,
253 N.E.2d 207, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969); McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416
S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967). It is still argued by some that the two theories can be
used compatibly. See, e.g., Wininger & Lee, Breach of Warranty and Strict Lia-
bility-A Unified Approach to the Preparation and Trial of a Product Liability
Case, 3 Am. J. TRIuL ADVOCACY 29 (1979). Professor Keeton disagrees. See Keeton,
supra note 44, at 35-36.
56. See generally Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 IIl. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d
305 (1970); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(960)57. See generally Crystal Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cathey, 88 Ariz. 163, 317
P.2d 1094 (1957); Worley v. Proctor &c Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253
S.W.2d 532 (St. L. 1952); Madouros v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 230
Mo. App. 275, 90 S.W.2d 445 (K.C. 1986); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,
32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 59 Misc. 2d 241, 298
N.Y.S.2d 538 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
58. See Keeton, supra note 44, at 35-36.
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templated by the ordinary consumer who purchased it with the ordinary
knowledge common to the community as to the product's characteristics.e0
In other words, if the product was more dangerous than the consumer
contemplated in some respect, then it is defective in that respect. This test
reflects the origins of strict liability, and unfortunately, those origins were
rooted in contract law and were designed to deal with commercial losses.
The'test is a good test for dealing with commercial losses. 61 It is inade-
quate, however, for dealing with the problem of personal injuries resulting
from accidents. The warranty of merchantability was an obligation im-
posed on the seller to protect against intangible economic losses and com-
mercial losses.62 The theory behind the warranty was that a merchant, in
offering his goods for sale, was making an implied representation that his
goods were fit for the ordinary purposes for which those goods were in-
tended.0 3
One of the difficulties with products liability law today is that the
consumer contemplation test has been used repeatedly in judicial opinions.
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and its sponsor, the
American Law Institute, is much to blame for this.0 4 The consumer con-
templation test is inadequate as a test for defectiveness for at least three
reasons.
First, under this test a victim could never recover for harm suffered
as a result of a design hazard that was open or obvious, or one with respect
to which the purchaser was adequately informed, because under these
conditions he could not have been deceived about what he was buying.
The purchaser received what he expected to buy, regardless of injurious
results. This indeed has been the result reached by many courts. 65 For-
tunately, however, there is a trend away from this conclusion.
60. RESTATEAMN (SECOND) OF TORTs § 402A, Comment i (1965). Section
402A reads:(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to
his property, if(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
61. See Fischer, Products Liability-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REv.
339, 348 (1974).
62. See Keeton, supra note 1, at 301-02.
63. Id. See generally Fischer, supra note 61.
64. See Keeton, supra note 44, at 32.
65. See, e.g., Morrocco v. Northwest Eng'r Co., 310 F.2d 809 (6th Cir.
1962); May v. Allied Chlorine & Chem. Prods., Inc., 168 So. 2d 784 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1964); Stevens v. Durbin-Durco, Inc., 377 S.W.2d 343 (Mo. 1964); Baker v.
Stewart Sand & Material Co., 353 S.W.2d 108 (Mo. App., K.C. 1961); Schild v.
Schild, 176 Neb. 282, 125 N.W.2d 900 (1964).
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As previously discussed, on a negligence theory it was commonly held
that a seller's duty could be satisfied by giving adequate warnings of risks
and hazards that were not otherwise obvious.66 The idea supporting this
result was that a seller's responsibility for design hazards was satisfied so
long as people knew what they were getting.67 The manufacturer's re-
sponsibility was to see to it that the purchaser was an informed purchaser,
and that satisfied his duty.68 There are many today who still urge that
judges and juries should not be attempting to determine how safely farm
machinery should be designed, how safely industrial machinery should be
designed, and how safely motor equipment should be designed, so long
as purchasers know what they are buying.69 That is a reasonable argument
to make, but one with which I do not agree. I do not think the market-
place will give us the kind of safety that we need to have.
The idea that was behind the law, and the idea that many people now
have, is that as long as the purchaser knows what he is buying, it is his
responsibility in using the product to avoid accidents. But what if it just
takes a few dollars more to make something safer? For example, what if
a ten-thousand dollar piece of machinery is being produced and it takes
only two or three hundred dollars more to prevent a number of accidents?
The consumer contemplation test is inadequate for not taking into account
this kind of situation. Using this test, the manufacturer is not responsible
for failing to add the relatively inexpensive safety device if the purchaser
knows that it does not exist and that there is a resulting danger.
Second, this test can result in the identification of products as being
defectively dangerous which are clearly not.70 For example, consider the
situation where a product, such as a drug, produces a harmful side effect
which was unknown by either the seller or the user.71 There is hardly any
drug that does not have side effects which are unknown when it first is
put on the market. So there is an unknown risk, a hazard that is not con-
templated. Penicillin was that kind of a product, but it was also a great
benefit to humanity. Was it a bad product? By any reasonable definition
it was not, but it had a risk about it-now knowable-which made it more
66. See notes 31-35 and accompanying text supra.
67. See Keeton, supra note 35, at 400-12.
68. Id.
69. See Carmen v. Eli Lilly & Co., 109 Ind. App. 76, 85-86, 32 N.E.2d 729,
732 (1941). Some courts have accepted the defense of assumption of the risk
where the plaintiff knew the dangers of the product. See generally McCarty v.
F.C. Kingston Co., 22 Ariz. App. 17, 522 P.2d 778 (1974); Williams v. Brown Mfg.
Co., 45 111. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970); Collins v. Musgrave, 28 ll. App. 3d
307, 328 N.E.2d 649 (1975); Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362
(Mo. 1969); Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1853 (Okla. 1974); Find-
lay v. Copeland Lumber Co., 265 Or. 300, 509 P.2d 28 (1973); Ernest W. Hahn,
Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 1979).
70. See General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 545 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. Civ. App.
1971), rev'd, 558 S.W.2d 855 (T7ex. 1977).
71. See generally Keeton, Products Liability-Drugs and Cosmetics, 25 VAD.
L. REv. 131 (1972).
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dangerous than contemplated, and some people were victimized by this
danger. The danger still exists, only now we are aware of it. One can
argue that we ought to have liability in such cases, but that is a rather far-
reaching argument to which I do not subscribe.
Third, there is a fallacious assumption underlying the consumer con-
templation test that the ordinary purchaser knows what he is buying.72 In
most cases, the purchaser does not have any idea about the safety or danger
of what he is buying. He is generally buying on price, on beauty, and on
function.
Consider the case of Heaton v. Ford Motor Co.7 3 as an example. Plain-
tiff was injured in an accident caused by the rim of a wheel separating
from the interior portion of the wheel. There was evidence at trial that
a short time prior to the accident a rock about five inches in diameter hit
the wheel. It was the plaintiff's theory that the wheel was defectively de-
signed if it could not withstand the impact of the rock. The court was
trying to use the consumer contemplation test, but finally realized that
this test might not apply to all fact situations.74 Thus, one major defect
with the test is that sometimes consumers have no definite expectations
about what they are purchasing, and in these instances the jury can only
speculate as to a product's defectiveness. It is, however, possible to get
expert testimony about such products as the wheel and rim to assist the
jury in making a determination as to whether the product was defectively
designed, an approach suggested by the court in Heaton.75
In General Motors Corp. v. Simmons7 6 a Texas case which was decided
in 1976, but which does not represent the current law in Texas,7 7 the plain-
tiff lost his eyesight when the side window of his automobile shattered
and small, dull particles of glass became lodged in his eye. The side win-
dow of the car involved in the collision was made of so-called tempered
glass, as are virtually all side windows of automobiles. This kind of glass
shatters, but unlike plate glass, it shatters into small, dull particles. The
trial judge charged the jury pursuant to the consumer contemplation test,
and the jury found for plaintiff and awarded damages of one million dol-
lars. The appellate court upheld the verdict, reduced the damage award
to five hundred thousand dollars, and concluded that "[t]here is testimony
from which the jurors as reasonable persons could have concluded that
72. See generally Hubbard, Reasonable Human Expectations: A Normative
Model for Imposing Strict Liability for Defective Products, 29 MEacza L. R~rv.
465 (1978); Keeton, supra note 44; Rheingold, What Are the Consumer's "Reason-
able Expectations"? , 22 Bus. LAw. 589 (1967).
73. 248 Or. 467, 435 P.2d 806 (1967) (appellate court affirmed trial court's
dismissal of plaintiff's suit on ground that evidence was insufficient to establish
defectiveness).
74. Id. at 472, 435 P.2d at 808.
75. Id. at 473-74, 435 P.2d at 809.
76. 545 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976), rev'd, 558 S.W.2d 855 ('rex. 1977).
77. 558 S.W.2d 855 (rex. 1977), rev'g 545 S.W.2d 502 (rex. Civ. App. 1976).
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General Motors made a decision in designing its 1962 model cars to use
tempered glass rather than laminated glass in the door windows of all cars
it assembled." 78 The court went on to point out that "[t]he jury could
have concluded that as a result of a slight collision the tempered glass
shattered and flew about in the car with sufficient force to penetrate Mr.
Simmons' eyes." 79
It is clearly true that the injury would not have been suffered had
laminated glass been used. The jury apparently concluded that the temp-
ered glass would be unknown to the ordinary user and therefore more
dangerous than would be contemplated. In other words, all plaintiff had
to prove was an uncontemplated accident for the jury to find liability.
I called an engineer when I read this case and asked him why a
manufacturer would make side windows out of tempered glass instead of
laminated glass. He answered simply, "It costs a good deal less." His an-
swer raises a very good question. How much are we willing to pay for
safety features in products? The consumer contemplation test fails to take
into account such factors as the cost of additional safety features, and the
test is inadequate for that reason.
B. The Risk-Utility Test
The second test, and in my opinion the preferred test, for finding a
defective design is the risk-utility test, sometimes called the danger versus
utility balancing test. The theory underlying this approach is that virtually
all products have both risks and benefits.80 I propose that there is no way
to go about evaluating design hazards without weighing these factors. Some
form of the risk-utility approach has been adopted in recent years as the
sole basis for ascertaining whether or not a product is unreasonably dang-
erous as designed in at least two states, Pennsylvania and Texas.8 ' Under
the test a product is defective as designed in some aspect if a reasonable
person would conclude that the magnitude of the danger-in-fact, as proved
at trial, outweighs the utility of the product.8 2 In other words, if a reason-
able person would conclude that the danger-in-fact in using the product
outweighs the utility, then the product is defective. Please note that the
test considers the danger-in-fact, not whether the manufacturer perceived
the danger, because the purpose is to evaluate the product itself, not the
manufacturer's conduct.
The utility of the design is affected by three important considerations.
The first and most important consideration is an evaluation of the needs,
78. 545 S.W.2d at 515.
79. Id.
80. See Keeton, supra note 44, at 37-39.
81. See Azzarello v. Black Bros., 480 Pa. 547, 558-59, 391 A.2d 1020, 1026-27
(1978); Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 850-51 (Tex. 1979).
82. See Keeton, supra note 44, at 37-39.
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wants, or desires that are served by the product.8 3 For example, a drug
often satisfies a very important need; therefore, the mere fact that it has
some side effects which are harmful does not automatically mean that the
danger outweighs the great benefits. I mentioned to a student in class that
cigarettes are probably the worst product on the market. I was challenged
on that, and rightly so. I had overlooked the fact that many people derive
considerable pleasure and satisfaction from smoking. The needs, wants, or
desires that a product serves should always be taken into account in eval-
uating defectiveness. Even breathing has its hazards, but it has not yet
been declared defective.
Second, utility of design is affected by the technological and economic
feasibility, and practicability, of serving the need with alternative pro-
ducts.8 4 For example, consider cosmetics, to which three percent of the
population is allergic.8 5 If you could devise a cosmetic that would serve
the need just as well, to which only one percent of the people would be
allergic, then one would be more likely to conclude that cosmetics as
presently designed are defective products. The extent to which the needs
or wants of society can be satisfied by alternative products which produce
less harm is quite relevant.
Third, utility of design is affected by the technological and economic
feasibility of serving society's needs with a safer product.88 The standard
meat-cutting machine could be designed with a safety device that would
make it virtually impossible for a person's hand to get caught in the cut-
ting mechanism. The device might, however, impair the usefulness and
serviceability of the machine. This is certainly an important consideration
in evaluating product utility. In my opinion, eighty percent of the design
cases ought to be litigated on the question of whether or not it would have
been feasible, technologically and economically, to do a better job in de-
signing the product.
In essence, the risk-utility test directs the attention of attorneys, trial
judges, and juries to the necessity of weighing the danger-in-fact of a par-
ticular feature of a product against its utility.8 7 The only way to ascertain
whether or not a design is good or bad is to inquire about the danger in-
herent in it and the justification for this danger.
83. Ross v. Up-Right, Inc., 402 F.2d 943, 946 (5th Cir. 1968).
84. See Keeton, supra note 44, at 38.
85. See H. RAPX'AORT, THE COMPLErE ALmGY GUIDE 241 (1970) ("esti-
mated that more than 3,000,000 Americans are allergic to cosmetics"); H. SWARTZ,
Tnm ALLERGY GUIDE BooK 111 (1961) (estimated that seven million American
women are allergic to cosmetics); R. WIra, A CONSurA's DiC'noNARY or Cos-
mETrI INGREDIENTs 4 (1974) (one out of every ten Americans is susceptible to
cosmetic allergies). See generally Keeton, supra note 71.
86. See Metal Window Prods. Co. v. Magnusen, 485 S.W.2d 355, 358 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1972) (transparent glass door not defective because plaintiff aware of
the danger).
87. See generally Keeton, supra note 1; Keeton, supra note 44.
1980)
15
Keeton: Keeton: Meaning of Defect in Products Liability Law
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1980
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
IV. "STATE oF Tm ART"
As can be seen by a review of the cases, the risk-utility test is not al-
ways the test used to determine liability.8 8 In fact, it is often difficult to
tell whether or not any particular test is used at all.S9 It, therefore, seems
worthwhile to digress from my discussion on defining defectiveness and
address a problem which is presently hindering litigation in the area of
products liability. The problem centers around the use of the term "state
of the art."
"State of the art" is a term used very frequently in products liability
litigation.00 The problem is that the term is used to mean different things
at different times; the resulting confusion is not surprising. It has been
urged, both in the courtroom and in legislative halls, that if a machine,
drug, or any other product has been designed in conformity with the
"state of the art" at the time possession was surrendered by the manu-
facturer, then either (1) the product should not be regarded as defective,91
or (2) if the product is found to be defective, then the manufacturer
should be excused from strict liability on the ground that he conformed
to the "state of the art" as best he could.92 The validity of this argument
depends on how the term "state of the art" is used. I have perceived at
least three different usages of the term.
"State of the art" has often been used to refer to the customary practic-
es employed in designing a product. In Gonzales v. Caterpillar Tractor
.Co.,0 for example, a Caterpillar tractor was designed with a step to assist
the employee in getting up into the rider's seat. The problem with the
step was that it became muddy when the tractor was used in wet weather.
The step was the only way the user had of getting on and off the. tractor.
In this case, the plaintiff fell when getting off the tractor, and seriously
injured his back. At trial, the defense presented evidence that this tractor
was designed exactly like all other tractors. There was also evidence in
the record presented by plaintiff's safety expert, who testified that for
about the same cost and without impairment of the use of the tractor, a
retractable step could have been designed to eliminate this hazard. The
trial court held, correctly in my opinion, that custom does not control as
regards the issue of negligence, and the manufacturer was found liable.
Business or industrial custom should not control the determination as to
whether a product has been properly designed. A defendant's conformance
with the "state of the art," when the term is used in the sense of business
or industrial custom, should not absolve him from liability for a -defective
,product.
88. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 8d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 433 (1972), discussed in Keeton, supra note 44, 'at 30-32.
89. See generally Keeton, supra note 44; Traynor, supra note 54.
90. See Keeton, supra note 26, at 677-78.
91. See generally Keeton, supra note 26.
92. Id.
93. 571 S.W.2d 867 ('ex. 1978).
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"State of the art" is also frequently used to mean that which is feasible
in light of the technology which existed at the time the product was de-
signed. This is the definition that I use. This definition requires considera-
tion of what was reasonably capable of being done technologically and
economically to reduce the risk of hazard.94 While a defendant's com-
pliance with what was technologically and economically feasible does not
necessarily mean that his product is not defective, a product's design
should normally be measured in terms of whether or not it was feasible
to do a better job in the light of the technology that was available at the
time. In other words, while not conclusive, this is a relevant factor.
"State of the art" is also sometimes used to refer to the technological
capability of an industry to discover a risk or hazard in a product. In my
view, however, it does not necessarily make any difference whether a haz-
ard is discovered or not. The fact that a manufacturer may be incapable of
discovering a risk is irrelevant. We judge the effectiveness of a product on
the basis of the danger-in-fact, whether realized or not.95 For example,
there was a vaccine that was put on the market some years ago called
quadrigen; it was a four-in-one vaccine, for whooping cough, diptheria,
tetanus, and polio.96 Prior to the time this vaccine was composed, there
was a three-in-one vaccine for whooping cough, diptheria, and tetanus. It
was then decided to add polio to the list of diseases which one vaccine
would protect against. The new vaccination gave some children a high
fever, and even caused mental retardation in some. Assume that there was
room for the jury to believe that it was scientifically unknowable that this
would happen. In my opinion, that would not matter because it was such
a dangerous product. The harm done just to a few people outweighed all
the benefits because the only benefit was that the vaccine could be given
once, instead of on two different occasions.97
V. CONCLUSION
Weighing benefit against harm is not peculiar to products liability
law. If you have a dangerous railroad crossing, you measure benefits
against danger in making a decision as to whether or not there should be
94. For a state products liability statute which bears resemblance to Pro-
fessor Keeton's preferred use of the term "state of the art," consider the following
language from NEB. R1Ev. STAT. § 25-21,182 (1979):
In any product liability action based upon negligent or defective design,
testing, or labeling, proof establishing that such design, testing, or labeling
was in conformity with the generally recognized and prevailing state of
the art in the industry at the time the specific product involved in the
action was first sold to any person not engaged in the business of selling
such product shall be a defense. State of the art as used in this section
shall be defined as the best technology reasonably available at the time.
95. See generally Keeton, supra note 44.
96. See Tinnerholm v. Parke, Davis Sc Co., 411 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1969) (lia-
bility predicated on warranty theory); Parke-Davis 9: Co. v. Stromsodt, 411 F.2d
1390 (8th Cir. 1969) (liability predicated on tort and warranty theory).
97. See Keeton, supra note 71, at 143.
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an overpass. It costs a great deal of money to have an overpass. How many
people will be killed before the decision is made to build? It is a difficult
problem. As far as products liability law is concerned, we should be talking
about what the danger-in-fact really was, and not what was perceived to
be the danger under the "state of the art."
While many factors are relevant in determining whether a product
is defectively designed, the focus must be on two points: the risk inherent
in the product and the utility of the product. By weighing these factors,
attorneys, judges, and juries can reach fair and reasonable conclusions in
products liability cases.
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